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Minogue v Victoria [2019] HCA 31Before Kiefel CJ, Bell, Gageler, Keane, Nettle, Gordon, Edelman JJ
Constitutional law – State Parliament – Constitution – Ch III – Where plaintiff convicted of murder of police officer – Where plaintiff sentenced to imprisonment for life with non-parole period – Where plaintiff's non-parole period expired – Where s 74AB of Corrections Act 1986 (Vic) prevented making of parole order in respect of plaintiff unless Adult Parole Board satisfied plaintiff in imminent danger of dying or seriously incapacitated and does not have physical ability to harm any person, and does not pose risk to community – Where s 74AB identified plaintiff by name and applied only to plaintiff – Where plaintiff not in imminent danger of dying or seriously incapacitated – Where s 74AAA of Corrections Act imposed conditions for making parole order if person convicted of murder and victim police officer – Whether ss 74AB and 74AAA contrary to Ch III of Constitution and therefore invalid – Whether ss 74AB and 74AAA impermissibly legislatively resentenced plaintiff – Whether ss 74AB and 74AAA impose additional or separate punishment to that imposed by sentencing court – Whether s 74AB distinguishable from provision upheld in Knight v Victoria (2017) 261 CLR 306; [2017] HCA 29 – Whether Knight and Crump v New South Wales (2012) 247 CLR 1; [2012] HCA 20 should be reopened.
Words and phrases – "additional or separate punishment", "judicial power", "legislative punishment", "legislatively resentenced", "life imprisonment", "minimum term", "more punitive or burdensome to liberty", "non-parole period", "opportunity to be considered for release on parole", "parole", "severity of the punishment", "substantive operation and practical effect". Constitution, Ch III. Corrections Act 1986 (Vic), ss 74AAA, 74AB, 127A. |
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Taylor v Attorney-General (Cth) [2019] HCA 30Before Kiefel CJ, Bell, Gageler, Keane, Nettle, Gordon, Edelman JJ
Criminal practice – Private prosecution – Authority to prosecute – Where private citizen sought to commence criminal proceeding for offence of crime against humanity contrary to s 268.
11 of Criminal Code (Cth) – Where offence located within Div 268 of Criminal Code – Where s 268.
121(1) provides that proceedings under Div 268 must not be commenced without Attorney-General's written consent – Where Attorney-General did not consent – Where s 268.
121(2) of Criminal Code provides that offence against Div 268 "may only be prosecuted in the name of the Attorney-General" – Where s 13(a) of Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) provides that any person may "institute proceedings for the commitment for trial of any person in respect of any indictable offence against the law of the Commonwealth" unless contrary intention appears – Whether s 268.
121(2) expresses contrary intention for purpose of s 13(a) – Whether s 268.
121(2) precludes private prosecution of offence against Div 268.
Words and phrases – "commencement of proceedings", "committal", "consent", "consent of the Attorney-General", "contrary intention", "crime against humanity", "in the name of", "indictable offence against the law of the Commonwealth", "private prosecution", "prosecuted in the name of the Attorney-General", "relator proceeding", "right to prosecute", "summary proceedings", "trial on indictment". Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s 13(a). Criminal Code (Cth), ss 268. 11, 268. 121. Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), ss 68, 69. |
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Bell Lawyers Pty Ltd v Pentelow [2019] HCA 29Before Kiefel CJ, Bell, Gageler, Keane, Nettle, Edelman JJ
Practice and procedure – Costs – Legal practitioners – Barristers – Where self-represented litigant may not obtain any recompense for value of his or her time spent in litigation – Where exception commonly referred to as "Chorley exception" exists for a self-represented litigant who is a solicitor – Where first respondent is a barrister – Where first respondent undertook legal work in litigation in which she was represented – Where first respondent incurred costs on her own behalf and for legal services provided by herself – Whether Chorley exception operates to benefit barristers – Whether Chorley exception recognised as part of common law of Australia.
Words and phrases – "anomalous", "Chorley exception", "common law of Australia", "costs", "costs payable", "creature of statute", "employed solicitors", "equality before the law", "exception to the general rule", "exercise of professional skill", "incorporated legal practice", "indemnity", "judicial abolition", "professional legal services", "prospective overruling", "remuneration", "rule of practice", "rules committees", "self-represented litigants", "statutory power". Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), ss 3(1), 98(1). |
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Lee v Lee [2019] HCA 28Before Kiefel CJ, Bell, Gageler, Nettle, Edelman JJ
Insurance law – Motor vehicles – Personal injury – Where appellant injured in motor vehicle collision – Where appellant gave evidence father driving vehicle at time of collision – Where appellant alleged injuries caused by negligence of father – Where appellant’s blood located on driver's airbag – Where expert evidence relating to possible source of blood – Where expert evidence relating to seatbelt and airbag design – Where trial judge concluded appellant driving vehicle – Where Court of Appeal dismissed appeal – Whether trial judge's findings glaringly improbable or contrary to compelling inferences.
Appeal – Rehearing – Where trial judge drew inferences and made findings of fact based on lay and expert evidence – Where Court of Appeal found inferences wrong in material respects – Whether Court of Appeal erred in failing to conclude trial judge misused advantage as trial judge – Whether Court of Appeal failed to conduct "real review" of evidence given and trial judge's reasons for judgment. Words and phrases – "contrary to compelling inferences", "glaringly improbable", "real review", "trial judge's advantage". |
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Brisbane City Council v Amos [2019] HCA 27Before Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane, Nettle, Edelman JJ
Limitation of actions – Debts created by statute – Debts secured by charge – Where Council commenced proceeding against respondent for overdue rates and charges – Where overdue rates and charges secured by charge – Where respondent argued claim was an action to recover a sum recoverable by virtue of an enactment under s 10(1)(d) of Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld) – Where Council argued claim was an action to recover a principal sum of money secured by a charge and subject to s 26(1) of the Act – Where proceeding falls within both ss 10(1)(d) and 26(1) – Whether s 26(1) applies to exclude operation of s 10(1)(d).
Words and phrases – "Barnes v Glenton", "claim in rem", "limitation of actions", "overlap between limitation periods", "personal claim", "real claim", "sums secured by mortgage or charge", "what claims are within limitation statutes". Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld), ss 10(1)(d), 26(1). |
